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Detzel: Corporal Punishment: Forty Whacks with the Fourteenth Amendment
CASE COMMENTS

CORPORAL PUNISHMENT: FORTY WHACKS WITH THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Ingrahamv. Wright, 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976)
Plaintiffs, students in the Dade County, Florida, school system, brought
a class action 1 alleging that the infliction of corporal punishment 2 deprived
them of their constitutional rights under the eighths and fourteenth4 amendments. Evidence was presented that punishment was administered contrary
to the procedures outlined by the school board. 5 The district court dismissed
the suit based on its finding that neither of the plaintiffs was deprived of
their constitutional rights. 6 The Fifth Circuit reversed and concluded instead
that there was substantial evidence to show procedural due process had not
been accorded the students. 7 On rehearing en banc, however, the court
reinstated the district court ruling, and HELD, the infliction of corporal
punishment did not subject these students to a grievous loss to which the
fourteenth amendment due process standards were applicable.8
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b). Plaintiffs brought three counts. The first two counts were
'actions by plaintiffs Ingraham and Andrew seeking compensatory and punitive damages
for personal injuries. Count three was a class action for declaratory and injunctive
relief. On each count, relief was sought under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970), which imposes
liability on one who, under color of state law, deprives another of his constitutional rights.
2. For the purposes of this comment, corporal punishment is defined as physical punishment administered to a person as a means of discipline.
3. "Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed, or cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII.
4. US. CONsr. amend. XIV provides in part that "No State shall- make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law ...
5. Dade County School Board Policy 5144 provides in pertinent part: "Corporal punishment may be used in the case where other means of seeking cooperation from the student
have failed.... Mhe teacher must confer with the principal. . : . [T-he student should
understand clearly the seriousness of the offense and the reason for the-punishment. .. . The
punishment must be administered in kindness and in the presence of another adult...
and no instrument shall be used that will produce physical injury to the student, and
.
no part of the body above the waist or below the knees may be 'struck."
The evidence was unrefuted-that these-procedures were consistently ignored. For example,
James Ingraham, a student at Drew -Junior High 'School claimed that he was innocent of
any wrongdoing and refused to be paddled. Principal Wright administered at least twenty
licks to Ingraham who was held struggling face down across a table. This beating produced
a painful and serious hematoma on his buttocks, as diagnosed by a physician, that
necessitated his absence from school for more than 10 schools days. Daniel Lee was
struck four or five times on the hand resulting in a fractured bone. He asked what he
had done, but the teacher refused to tell him. After one class member whistled, the teacher
began paddling the entire class of thirty to fifty students in an attempt to locate the culprit.
After about half the class had been spanked, some students revealed who had' whistled;
the rest of the class was spared. See Ingraham v. Wright, 498 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1974).
6. Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 912 (5th Cir. 1976).
'7. Ingraham v. Wright, 498 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1974). The court also held that while
corporal punishment is not a per se violation, corporal punishment as applied .in this
case did violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
8. Ingraham v., Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 919 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S.-Ct. 2200 (1976).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1967

1

Florida Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [1967], Art. 14

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVII

Corporal punishment as a means of discipline has long been practiced
by educators. 9 An early English common law doctrine, in loco parentis,
legitimated corporal punishment by recognizing a partial delegation of
parental authority to the pedagogue.' 0 Most states presently have statutes
that specifically authorize the teacher or principal to administer corporal
punishment" but only as a last resort in serious disciplinary cases .' 2 This
authority is generally restricted by state statutes"s and by common law 14 to the
infliction of corporal punishment that is reasonable under the circumstances.' 5 The student's common law remedy for excessive or unreasonable
punishment is a suit in tort for assault and battery against the punisher. 6
The teacher can also be held criminally liable for his tortious conduct under
many state statutes;" however, a student's constitutional rights have generally
not been addressed in the context of these traditional causes of action.
Constitutional challenges to the practice of corporal punishment were first
premised on the theory that corporal punishment violated basic parental
rights to raise and discipline one's children free of interference from the
state.' s In 1922 the United States Supreme Court recognized that the parent
has a specific right under the fourteenth amendment and penumbras of the
Bill of Rights to direct the upbringing and education of his children.19
The court also reinstated the district court's holding on the eighth amendment issue,
stating that the proscription of cruel and unusual punishment does not apply in a civil
context.
9. For a discussion of the utility of corporal punishment, see Note, Corporal Punishment
in the Public Schools, 6 HARV. Civ. RiGHTs-Civ. LiB. L. REV. 583 (1971).
10. See 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 453 (T. Cooley ed.
1884).
11. Only two states have statutes expressly prohibiting the use of corporal punishment
in the schools. See MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 71, §37g (Supp. 1974); N.J. STAT. ANN. §18A:6-1
(1968).
12. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §232.27 (1975). Policy 5144 of the Dade County School Board
provides: "Corporal punishment may be used in the case where other means of seeking
cooperation from the student have failed."
13. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §232.27 (1975); N.C. GEN. STAT. §115-146 (1971).
14. See, e.g., Suits v. Glover, 260 Ala. 449, 71 So. 2d 49 (1954); Tinkham v. Kole, 252
Iowa 1303, 110 N.W.2d 258 (1961).
15. All circumstances are to be taken into consideration, including the nature of the
offense; the age, sex, and strength of the child; his past behavior; the kind of punishment;
and the extent of the harm inflicted. W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS §27 (4th ed. 1964). See
Proehl, Tort Liability of Teachers, 12 VAND. L. REV. 723 (1959).
16. See, e.g., Tinkham v. Kole, 252 Iowa 1303, 110 N.W.2d 258 (1961).
17. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §28A.87.140 (1970).
18. Many suits recently have challenged the right of the state to allow corporal punishment over the objection of the parent. See, e.g., Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.
N.C. 1975), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 210 (1975) (the state has a legitimate interest in maintaining
order and discipline in school, and parental rights in this case are overriden by this state
interest). Contra, Glasser v. Marietta, 351 F. Supp. 555 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (school district
may enforce its rules on corporal punishment unless the parent of the child objects).
19. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), held unconstitutional a state statute forbidding the instruction of a foreign language in public schools to pupils who had not passed
the eighth grade. The Court said the state cannot unreasonably interfere with the liberty
of parents to direct the upbringing and education of their children. Id. at 399.
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Although recognized as "rights far more precious than property rights," 20
parental rights are not without limitation. 21 Thus, a balancing test was implemented to determine the degree to which the state could infringe the
fundamental rights of the parent. 22 Generally, if the state was able to show a
"compelling countervailing state interest," then the infliction of corporal
2
punishment was upheld. 3
Only recently has there been a recognition of the student's constitutional
right to be free from the infliction of corporal punishment.24 This development
stems from judicial cognizance of the fact that students are "persons" under
the Constitution. 25 The assertion of student constitutional rights in the area
of corporal punishment is based on three arguments: 1) the student has the
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment; 2 2) corporal punishment
20. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972),

quoting May v. Anderson, 345

U.S. 528, 533 (1953).
21. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). Accord, Pierce v. Society of
Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (in order for a deprivation of due process under the
fourteenth amendment to occur, rules and policies of school districts must bear "no
reasonable relation" to some purpose within the competency of the state).
22. See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (the state may not
force the children of Amish parents to attend public schools after the eighth grade); Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
23. It is still not settled whether the reasonable relation test developed in Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 278 U.S. 510 (1925) and Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C.
1975), or the compelling interest test of Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), should be
employed. The courts have been reluctant to declare corporal punishment wholly unrelated
to any legitimate goal, feeling that this is a legislative determination. See Ware v. Estes, 328
F. Supp. 657, 659 (N.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd, 458 F.2d 1360 (5th Cir. 1972) ("It is not within
this Court's function, or competence, to pass judgment on the merits of corporal punishment
as an educational tool . . . ."). This attitude may stem from reluctance on the court's
part to enter the educational field. As the Supreme Court has noted: "Courts do not and
cannot intervene in the resolution of conflicts which arise in the daily operation of school
systems and which do not directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values."
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968). But see note 73 infra and accompanying
text.
24. See Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1974).
25. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (landmark case requiring that juveniles
charged with criminal offenses be given basic procedural safeguards such as the right to
counsel, etc.). Accord, Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969):
"It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights...
at the school house gate." Id. at 506. "[Students] are possessed of fundamental rights
which the State must respect .
Id. at 511. See Note, In Loco Parentisand Due Process:
I..."
Should These Doctrines Apply to Corporal Punishment?, 26 BAYLOR L. REv. 678 (1974).

26. Decisions discussing the applicability of the eighth amendment to corporal punishment administered in public schools can be divided into three groups: 1) a case holding
that the eighth amendment does apply to corporal punishment in public schools-see
Bramlet v. Wilson, 495 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1974) (the case was remanded for factual
determination); 2) cases holding that the eighth amendment does not apply to corporal
punishment in public schools-see Sims v. Wan, 388 F. Supp. 543 (S.D. Ohio 1974);
Gonyaw v. Gray, 361 F. Supp. 366 (D. Vt. 1973); and 3) cases that assume, without
deciding, that the eighth amendment applies to the imposition of corporal punishment
but that in the instant case the punishment inflicted was not severe enough to constitute
cruel and unusual punishment-see Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975);
Glaser v. Marietta, 351 F. Supp. 555 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Ware v. E5tes, 328 1. Supp. 657
(N.D. Tex. 1971).
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is arbitrary, capricious, and unrelated to legitimate educational goals and
therefore denies the student substantive due process; 27 and 3) the infliction
of corporal punishment subjects the student to a loss of certain rights
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, and therefore procedural due
28
process safeguards should be applied.
Although all three arguments are raised in litigation, procedural due
process presents the most viable and consistent means of affording the student
protection against the arbitrary infliction of unreasonable punishment. 29
Substantial progress toward protecting the student during the administration
of discipline has taken place in the last 15 years. In a landmark decision,
Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education3 0° the Fifth Circuit concluded
that prior to expulsion 31 from public school the student must be afforded
certain safeguards to insure due process rights.3 2 Although the court stated
that "the nature of the proceeding will vary with the circumstances," the
general requirements mandated are a formal or informal hearing and notice.33
In 1975 the Supreme Court extended these procedural safeguards to
suspensions from public schools. In Goss v. Lope, 34 the Court established
a two-tiered analysis to be followed in determining procedural due process
that is necessary in school disciplinary cases. The first tier discerns whether
the right affected by the school proceeding is a protected right.35 Under the
fourteenth amendment, a protected right is any liberty or property interest
The basic question on which there is major disagreement among these cases is whether
the eighth amendment can apply in a civil context or whether it is applicable only to
criminal sanctions. Compare Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 531-32 (1968) ("The primary
purpose of that clause has always been considered to be directed at the method or kind
of punishment imposed for the violation of criminal statutes.") with Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) ("The amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency . . . .'). See Note, Corporal Punishment in Public Schools, 6 HARv. Civ.
RIGHTs-Crv. LIB. L. REV. 585 (1971). For treatment of the eighth amendment issue by
the Ingraham courts, see notes 7, 8 supra.
27. However, most courts have held that corporal punishment does not violate substantive due process, finding it difficult to contend that corporal punishment bears no
reasonable relation to legitimate educational goals. See, e.g., Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp.
294 (M.D.N.C. 1975); Ware v. Estes, 328 F. Supp. 657 (N.D. Tex. 1971). See note 23 supra.
28. Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
29. The eighth amendment issue necessarily presents a case-by-case approach and
provides little real preventive protection for the student. Moreover the eighth amendment
defies logical analysis for it lacks any standards to guide the administration of its
general proscription of "cruel and unusual punishment." This is the basis for much
of the criticism of the death penalty cases decided primarily on eighth amendment
grounds. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 239, 375 (1972) (Burger, J., dissenting). The
substantive due process issue is hampered by the courts' reluctance to declare corporal
punishment unrelated to any legitimate goal. See note 23 supra.
30. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
31. Expulsions are distinguished from suspensions in that expulsions impose absence
from school for more than 10 days and may be for as long as the remainder of the
school term. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 567 (1975).
32. 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961).
33. ld. at 158.
34. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
35. Id.
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that is greater than de minimis.a6 For example, in Goss the Court determined
a liberty interest existed that warranted protection because the student's

3
reputation, honor, or integrity could suffer as a result of the suspension. 7

The Court also stated that the student has a substantial property interest

since the student is statutorily entitled to a public educaion. Thus, the student
must be afforded an informal hearing before being denied his liberty and
property interest by suspension.3 s
In determining whether the harm caused by the invasion of these
interests amounted to a "grievous loss" within the confines of the fourteenth
amendment, the Court in Goss echoed the reasoning of Justice Harlan in
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.39 In Goss, as in Sniadach, the Court
specifically rejected the "grievous loss" standard stating that any loss greater
than de minimis will warrant due process protection. 40 To ascertain whether
a property or liberty interest was protected, the Court focused on the
nature of the interest involved, not on the gravity or weight of the injury.41
If a right is found that warrants protection, the second tier of the Goss
test must be utilized to ascertain what procedures are necessary to satisfy due
process. 42 Only after a protected right has been found under the first tier
will the gravity of the deprivation be examined 3 In cases involving corporal
punishment the state's interest in maintaining order in public schools must be
balanced against the student's interest in preserving intact his liberty or
property right.
Recently, one federal district court followed the concept of increased
protection for the student to its logical conclusion when the court applied
procedural safeguards to the infliction of corporal punishment in the case
of Baker v. Owen.- In Baker the court utilized the Goss analysis and
36. The courts tend to confuse the usage of the term "de minimis." The Goss court
recognized two distinct ways to come under the protection of the fourteenth amendment:
(1) if there is more than a de minimis deprivation of any right, or 2) if the property or
liberty interest itself is greater than de minimis. Id. at 576. However, the Ingraham
majority used neither of these two tests as a basis for invoking fourteenth amendment
protection but instead required a grievous deprivation of a substantial right. 525 F.2d at
918-19. This is a much stricter standard than the Supreme Court used in Goss. See text
accompanying notes 49-51 and 54-58 infra.
37. 419 U.S. at 574-75, citing Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971).
38. Ohio has a compulsory attendance law. Omo Rxv. CODE ANN. §3321.04 (Page
1972). As a result of this statute the Court held that a student had a legitimate claim of
entitlement to a public education.
39. 395 U.S. 337, 342 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring).
40. 419 U.S. at 576. This sentence reflects the first usage of the term de minimis. See
note 36 supra.
41. 419 U.S. at 576-77, citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570-71 (1972).
For a discussion of the grievous loss-de minimis tests, see Comment, 12

SAN

DiEGo L. REV.

912 (1975).
42. 419 U.S. at 577. "Once it is determined that due process applies, the question
remains what process is due." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
43. 419 U.S. at 577-78. The Court examines the degree of deprivation not to determine
whether a right exists but only as a guide to ascertain what kind of protection is
necessary.
. 44. 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.N.C.),. aff'd, 96 S. CL 210 (1975).
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determined that a liberty interest in personal integrity was invaded by corporal
punishment. Since this interest was protected by the fourteenth amendment, 43
certain minimal procedures were mandated to safeguard the liberty interest. 6
The court stated that the expansive concept of fourteenth amendment liberty
must include "personal security in the seemingly small things of life as
well as in the obviously momentous."47 The court found that three procedures were absolutely essential: 1)a listing of offenses that could occasion
the use of corporal punishment; 2) the presence of a second official at the
execution of the punishment who must be informed of the reasons for the
punishment; and 3) an explanation of the reasons for the punishment to be
given to the parent, if requested.48
In the instant case the Fifth Circuit refused to extend procedural due
process protection to students corporally punished. 4 9 The court was cognizant
of the Goss decision but distinguished it on the basis of an essential difference
between suspension and corporal punishment. The court noted that suspension
results in exclusion from the educational process and subsequent damage
to reputation, whereas the infliction of corporal punishment infringes neither
a property nor a liberty interest. 5° Therefore, the court failed to find a violation of student rights substantial enough to warrant constitutional protection.
The Fifth Circuit expressly rejected the Goss de minimis test in favor of the
"grievous loss" analysis stating that the infliction of a paddling does not
subject a school child to a grievous loss for which fourteenth amendment
due process standards should be applied. 51
Fearing that the imposition of procedural safeguards would seriously
undermine the utility of corporal punishment, the court refused to authorize
such procedures. 52 The court erroneously assumed that the procedures used
would be formal ones, much like those used in a court of law, and therefore
45. A recent Supreme Court case, Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976), expressed some
hesitancy concerning the protected nature of the liberty interest in Goss. However, Paul
can be narrowly construed to mean that only a defamation by a state official against an
individual without more does not violate a protected liberty interest of the fourteenth
amendment.
46. The Baker court determined that a liberty interest existed by employing the
second usage of de minimis. The court reasoned that if any liberty or property interest
greater than de minimis existed, the fourteenth amendment must be invoked to protect
it. 395 F. Supp. at 301. See note 36 supra.
47. 395 F. Supp. at 301.
48. The procedures were not included in the opinion of the court but rather were
listed in the judgment entered two months after the opinion. These procedures can be
found in Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976) (Rives, J., dissenting).
Baker was affirmed without opinion by the Supreme Court, but only that part of
the opinion dealing with cruel and unusual punishment was appealed. 96 S. Ct. 210 (1975).
49. 525 F.2d at 917.
50. Id. at 918-91. The court felt that a paddling could not deprive one of his property
right of entitlement to an education. Nor did a paddling inflict damage to one's reputation,
honor, or integrity so as to invade a liberty interest. See notes 36-41 supra and accompanying
text.
51. 525 F.2d at 918-19.
52. Id. at 919. The court also felt that the administrator of the punishment should
have the discretion to determine when and to what extent punishment should be inflicted.
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the effective administration of these procedures prior to punishment would
be impossible.53
The use by the majority of the grievous loss standard is more than just a
misapplication of Goss. Only after careful scrutiny of the latest cases involving procedural due process did the Supreme Court reach its decision in
Goss to adopt the lesser de minimis standard. Through this evaluation
the Supreme Court found the proper focal point to be the nature of the
right at stake, not the weight or gravity of the interest.54 The Supreme
Court in Fuentes v. Shevin 55 said:
While the length and consequent severity of deprivation may be
another factor to weigh in determining the appropriate form of hearing,
it is not decisive of the basic right to a prior hearing of some kind.56
Thus, the Fifth Circuit thwarted the specific intent of the Supreme Court
when it deemed the rights at stake in corporal punishment "not substantial
enough15 7 to warrant fourteenth amendment protection.
Additionally, the majority's fearful speculations that the utility of corporal
punishment will be undermined by the imposition of procedural safeguards
are unwarranted. In Dixon the Fifth Circuit stated that "the nature of the
hearing should vary depending on the circumstances of the particular case." 58
This statement was based on the view that due process is flexible in its application. 59 The formality and procedural requirements for the hearing can vary
depending on the importance of the interests involved and the nature of the
subsequent proceeding.60 Within the limits of practicability, certain minimal
procedures can be followed that will protect the student and yet not decrease
the effectiveness of corporal punishment. 61
The majority also unduly emphasized that the policy of the school
board was reasonable and purported to establish certain procedures that
would afford most students due process 6 2 These procedures, however, were
not followed by the teachers and principals at the school attended by the

53. Id. at 919, quoting Whately v. Pike County Bd. of Educ., CA. 977 (N.D. Ga.
1971) (unreported).
54. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971). See text accompanying note
41 supra.
55. 407 US. 67 (1972).
56. Id. at 86.
57. Justice Harlan concurring in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969),
stated: "[I]f the deprivation cannot be characterized as de minimis . . . [then there
must be] the usual requisites of procedural due process: notice and a prior hearing." Id.
at 342. See note 41 supra.
58. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd.of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961).
59. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
60. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971).
61. The procedures may be similar to those outlined in Baker. See note 48 supra.
However, increased or more stringent procedures may be necessary under the facts of
Ingraham.
62. 525 F.2d at 919 n.12.
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plaintiffs.63 Furthermore, the existence of school regulations should not pre-

clude the imposition of constitutional procedures. In Dixon the Fifth Circuit
stated that "the possibility of arbitrary action is not excluded by the existence
of reasonable regulations."64 Justice Douglas expressed a similar sentiment
in his dissent in Board of Regents v. Roth. "[T]he protection of the individual
against arbitrary action is the very essence of due process."1 5
Judge Rives' dissent in the present case66 emphasized that the distinction
between suspension and corporal punishment is illusory. The appropriate
question he posed was whether the plaintiff's loss for more than 10 days of his
statutory entitlement to attend school was any less a deprivation of property
because it resulted from a beating instead of from a formal suspension. 67
Framing the issue in terms of the Goss test, he noted:
The initial inquiry must be whether the plaintiff has a liberty or
property interest, greater than de minimis, in freedom from corporal
punishment such that the fourteenth amendment requires some procedural safeguards against its arbitrary imposition. Only if such an
interest is found must we6 8 proceed to an inquiry as to the type of
procedure to be employed.
The dissent further stressed that the facts were sufficient to indicate much
more than a de minimis deprivation of both liberty and property rights.69
The failure of the court to recognize the need for constitutional protections
for the student prior to punishment may have repercussions that are not
immediately apparent. The Fifth Circuit fallaciously assumed that there are
adequate remedies available to the student at the state level, 70 but the tort
and criminal actions71 against a school official for excessive punishment have
proved inadequate to deter abuses.7 2 Nor can they restore the student to his
63. See note 5 supra.
64.
65.

Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir. 1961).
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 584 (1972) (Douglas, J.,dissenting), citing

Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 559 (1956).
66. Five judges dissented, two of whom joined in the opinion of Judge Rives. 525
F.2d at 920-27.
67. 525 F.2d at 927. This was a reference to James Ingraham who missed over two
weeks of school due to a hematoma resulting from a school paddling. See note 5 supra.
68. 525 F.2d at 922, quoting Baker v. Owen, 395 F. Supp. 294, 305 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
69. 525 F.2d at 926-27. "The undisputed evidence discloses deprivations of liberty,
probability of severe psychological and physical injury, punishment of persons who were
protesting their innocence, punishment for no offense whatever . .. and all without the
slightest notice or opportunity for any kind of hearing." Id. The dissent then relates
several of the incidents that took place at Drew Junior High School.
70. 525 F.2d at 919.
71. See text accompanying notes 16, 17 supra.
72. A recovery for excessive punishment is difficult to obtain due to the court's
protective attitudes toward teachers. For example, many courts condition recovery on
the student proving that the teacher acted with actual malice. See, e.g., State v. Pendergrass, 19 N.C. 365 (1837). In Drake v. Thomas, 310 Ill. App. 57, 33 N.E.2d 889, 891 (1941),
the court stated: "[T]he presumption is in favor of the correctness of the teacher's action
in inflicting corporal punishment upon the pupil .... For an error in judgment, although
the punishment is unnecessarily excessive, if it is not of a nature to cause lasting injury,
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pre-punishment status since a paddling is not compensable. 73 Moreover, recourse to the school board willbe equally futile. If the particular school board
has procedures established to protect the student and these procedures are
not complied with, the student will rarely be able to force the school board
to recognize his rights. In any case, a review after the punishment has been
inflicted can do little to restore a student wrongfully punished. 74 Only through
the enforcement of constitutionally-mandated procedures prior to the infliction of corporal punishment can the student be adequately protected against
arbitrary and unreasonable punishment.
The second consequence of this decision is extrapolated from the very
nature of a proceeding that inflicts corporal punishment on the student. When
such an infliction occurs without prior recourse to protective procedures, the
proceeding is similar to a summary process. In Fuentes v. Shevin, the Supreme
Court expressed concern over the widespread use of summary process in connection with deprivation of property rights and articulated the notion that
only under extraordinary circumstances should such summary process be
utilized.75 The burden of demonstrating these circumstances is on the one
seeking to invoke the use of the summary process.76 Applying the Fuentes
rationale to the instant case, it becomes imperative that only when there is
a clear danger that delaying punishment would cause great disruption in the
school should resort be made to inflicting corporal punishment without first
taking certain precautions. Answering this argument, the Fifth Circuit has
asserted in the instant case that the student has no property or liberty right
worthy of protection; therefore, the student is subject to continued summary
process. The net effect of this decision is to shift the burden to the student
to show, after the application of the punishment, that due process procedures
should have been implemented, and as a result of this failure he has suffered
irreparable harm. The burden the Fifth Circuit has placed on the average
77
student may well prove to be intolerable.
It must be realized that the courts cannot police all aspects of school behavior. However, having found it necessary to impose certain procedural
and he acts in good faith, the teacher is not liable." See also People v. Mummert, 183 Misc.
243, 50 N.Y.S.2d 699 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (conviction for assault reversed on the grounds

that the discretion vested in teacher gives him considerable allowance in determining
punishment, absent a showing of malice). However, the modern approach, which is
followed by a majority of jurisdictions, conditions liability on an external standard of
reasonableness. People v. Curtiss, 116 Cal. App. 771, 300 P. 801 (Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
See Proehl, Tort Liability of Teachers, 12 VAND. L. REV. 723, 734-38 (1959).

73. Can money damages ever really compensate for physical injuries, or is the idea of

"compensatory damages" a tort fiction?

74. If a student is punished immediately for an alleged wrong without being given
a chance to explain, there is no chance that a mistake by the teacher will be discovered
before punishment.
75. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
76. An example of extraordinary circumstances would be when there is a possibility
that contaminated food will be sold in commerce and consumers could be harmed. The

burden in this situation would be on the agency seeking a summary procedure.
77. The Fifth Circuit is forcing the student to police the very punishment inflicted

on him yet stripping him of any power to do so.
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safeguards on school expulsion and suspension proceedings,78 the federal
judiciary cannot extricate themselves from the school arena simply because
there may be problems of administration. Nor can they abdicate their duty
in favor of state remedies, especially when such state remedies are incomplete.
Justice Douglas once observed that "it is procedure that marks much of
the difference between rule by law and rule by fiat."79 It is encumbent on
courts to recognize that a student's claim to protection from arbitrary corporal
punishment through the implementation of procedural safeguards cannot
be deemed to be wholly insignificant. 80
LAUREN DETZEL
78. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
79. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971).
80. In the 1976 regular session of the Florida legislature, a bill was passed that set
up some general guidelines for student discipline. Specifically, FLA. STAT. §232.27 was
amended to incorporate the following procedures: "If a teacher feels that corporal punishment is necessary, at least the following procedures shall be followed: (I) The use of
corporal punishment shall be approved in principle by the principal before it is used,
but approval is not necessary for each specific instance in which it is used. (2) A teacher
or principal may administer corporal punishment only in the presence of another adult
who is informed beforehand, and in the student's presence, of the reason for the punishment. (3) A teacher or principal who has administered punishment shall, upon request,
provide the pupil's parent or guardian with a written explanation of the reason for the
punishment and the name of the other teacher or principal who was present." Fla. Laws
1976, ch. 76-236, §9, to be codified as FLA. STAT. §232.27. These safeguards are identical
to two of the three procedural requirements imposed by a federal district court in Baker
v. Owen. See text accompanying note 48 supra.
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